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ABSTRACT 
This work explores the rise and fall of proposals, which were current between 
1945 and 1977, for an inner suburban radial freeway network in Sydney. 
Conceived in terms of the planning process operating in New South Wales 
during this period, the focus throughout is on the inner western suburbs of 
Sydney where the most significant local opposition to the proposals emerged. 
When the proposals were first formulated by the Department of Main Roads in 
the late 1940s, ushering in the era of fixed grand plans for entire regional areas, 
freeways promised a safe, fast, efficient means of private travel which would 
provide the solution to all the city's transport needs. As Sydney underwent 
decentralisation in the 1950s and 1960s, however, and as car numbers rapidly 
increased, important questions emerged about whether freeways were 
appropriate forms for the urban environment. 
The first half of the work identifies the complex range of attitudes towards 
urban freeways taken by the participants in the planning process, and shows how 
the DMR and its proposals remained unchallenged in the state political arena 
until the 1970s. The second half discusses the emergence and operation of 
external political forces - in the form of the Whitlam labor government, the 
New South Wales Builders' Labourers Federation, and residents' groups - which 
opposed the freeways. It describes how they were able to make an impact on the 
state planning process and gives an account of process which led to most of the 
radial proposals being abandoned by the state government in 1977. The closing 
section gives a short review of current freeway and tollway schemes in Sydney 
and draws out some of the lessons of the earlier period. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE STRUCTURES OF OUR AGE 
Freeways which carry the automobile are amongst the most beautiful 
structures of our age. Along with skyscrapers they are certainly the most 
typical of our civilisation.1 
Freeways have done terrible things to cities, and in many instances have 
almost irreparably destroyed large sections of the cities which they were meant 
to serve.2 3 * 
Urban development, planned or unplanned, is essentially a political 
process of choosing between a range of competing possible land uses, broadly 
consisting of housing, employment, recreation, natural sanctuary and transport 
infrastructure. Developing and implementing any urban plan, being an exercise 
in directing urban development to achieve desired outcomes, is therefore a 
political process in which the priorities between different forms of land use are 
debated. 
The New South Wales Department of Main Roads (DMR) put forward its 
first proposals for urban freeways in Sydney in 1945/1946/ Over time, the 
proposed network was expanded by the Department to move traffic from as far 
afield as Penrith, Campbelltown, Wollongong, Bondi Junction, Newcastle and 
Windsor directly into the Sydney Central Business District (CBD). The 
Department embarked on a program of land acquisition and large swathes of 
inner suburban land became ‘DMR affected'. Financial constraints meant that 
progress on the actual building was slow however, and by 1970 only the Cahill 
Expressway and the first stage of the Warringah Expressway had been built. 
During the 1970s the sections of the DMR’s freeway plans in the vicinity of the 
CBD fell from political favour and were abandoned by the State Government in 
1977. 
This paper aims to account for the rise and fall of the proposed freeways 
through suburbs close to the CBD, with a particular focus on the inner west, in 
terms of the way in which the political process of planning Sydney’s land use 
operated during the lifetime of the radial freew7ay proposals. As forms of 
transport infrastructure, freeways are voracious users of land. A freeway with a 
1 Lawrence Halprin, Freeways. Reinhold, New York, 1966, 17 
2 Ibid.. 24 
3 Department of Main Roads, Main Roads Development Plan for the Svdnev Metronolis and the 
County of Cumberland. DMR, Sydney, 1946 -- 
1 
three lane carriageway in each direction (two such roads were planned for Glebe 
and Annandale) cuts a corridor of at least one hundred metres through the 
landscape it traverses 4 Accordingly, its impact on other land uses, while 
negligible where the density of other existing land use is low, will be 
disproportionately high in areas which have high existing land use densities. 
Responsibility for freeway policies and proposals in New South Wales 
ultimately rests with the state politicians. Politicians do not operate in a vacuum, 
however. They make decisions in the context of a range of heard opinions on 
relevant subjects voiced by a range of opinion holders. Whether an opinion is 
heard depends on the vocal strength of those holding it, on the strength and the 
number of other competing voices, and on the politicians’ inclination to hear. 
Political voices articulate the meanings which plans and policies hold for 
them. Many different individuals and classes of people will come into contact 
with a freeway, with each giving it some kind and degree of meaning. Even if a 
person ignores it completely, they are making an implicit statement either that 
the freeway means nothing to them, or that they are perfectly satisfied with it, or 
that they believe that they cannot influence its course. Further, any one 
assignment of meaning can potentially suppress other possible meanings. Human 
nature ensures that any assessment of meaning is based on an individual’s own 
situation and their own ideological, political and pragmatic interests. Therefore, 
conflict between the different meanings of a freeway and ambivalence about its 
function and role are inevitable. These conflicts may be between individuals, or 
within individuals. For example, urban planners, motorists, engineers and 
motor industry workers can also be users of public transport, residents ot areas 
affected by freeway proposals or conservationists, and vice versa. 
In the 1940s, professional planners working within the New South Wales 
Government based their plans for Sydney on a modernist ideology ot urban 
development in which the central ideal was the rational efficient pursuit ot and 
progress towards the goal of happiness, assisted by experts and by modern 
technology such as the automobile.5 Urban freeways, together with skyscrapers, 
were the ultimate symbols of this ideology. The very terms ‘freeway’ and 
‘expressway’ derived from the simple efficient ‘express’ rationality ot the 
unbroken straight line or smooth curve which are its perfect aesthetic forms.6 
Supported by State and Federal Labor Government enthusiasm tor post-war 
4 E. R. Jefferay, Planning and Design of Urban Expressways in NSW with Particular reference 
to the Countv of Cumberland. Institute of Engineers, Sydney, 1963, 4 
5 L. Kilmartin, Cities Unlimited. Allen and Unwin, Hornsby, 1978 
6 Halprin, op cit., 12 
reconstruction, the planners produced plans which they believed could usher in a 
‘better world’.7 By designing fixed grand plans for entire regional areas, by 
improving physical conditions through the construction of gardens, parks and 
playgrounds, and by using freeways to clear the undesirable slum areas of the 
inner suburbs, they thought that they could eliminate all the unwanted social and 
economic consequences of the industrial revolution, including crime, over¬ 
crowding and ill health.8 
The Department of Main Roads’ legislative brief was to ‘provide for the 
better construction, maintenance and financing of main roads .9 It was therefore 
bound to seek to build roads because that was its job. Consequently, its staff were 
drawn largely from the engineering profession, since road construction requires 
engineering technical experience and expertise. Aside from giving the cult of 
the expert’ a chance to take hold in their dealings with outsiders, the need for 
their expertise gave DMR engineers opportunity to show off their skills and gain 
professional pride by building ever more sophisticated roads. When the 
Department first proposed its freeway network, no such roads had been built in 
any urban area anywhere in the world.10 The DMR was therefore at the 
forefront of urban transport infrastructure planning and design. 
Successfully overcoming the peculiar problems of inner city freeways, 
including the need to reduce pollution levels to avoid irritating the local 
residents, can be seen as the pinnacle of professional road engineering expertise. 
Consequently, DMR engineers were usually keen to propose or accept such 
challenges and continually justified their proposals as ‘the best possible answer 
anyone could produce'11 for traffic problems. Engineers, in common with all 
other interest groups, also have unconscious biases which affected their view of 
Sydney’s freeways. Building and construction occupations are mainly concerned 
with quantifiable facts, resulting in an intellectual climate in which all decisions 
tended to be made on the basis of such facts. Since methods for quantifying 
pollution and other environmental effects were not developed until the 
introduction of Environmental Impact Statements in the late 1970s, these effects 
H. Sherrard, Sydney Metropolitan Main Roads Planning 1925-1962', Australian Planning 
Institute Journal. July 1964 17-14 
8 Leonie Sandercock, 'Educating planners: from physical determinism to economic crisis’, in 
L. Sandercock and M. Berry (eds.), Urban Political Economy: The Australian Case. Allen and 
Unwin, Sydney, 1983, 34-5 
9 Main Roads Act 1924 
10 Albert Mispel, Speech to Anti-Freewav Rally - Fig St. Ultimo 5/10/74 (LL) 
11 Ken Dobinson (DMR traffic service engineer (1976), Deputy Chief Engineer by 1987) 
quoted in Jenny Salmon, Forgotten Suburbs 1987 (video recording) (DPL) 
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were commonly ignored by Sydney’s freeway proponents. 
The most striking way in which the attitudes of freeway engineers 
coincided with the ‘better world’ ideal is that they tended to be mainly concerned 
with safe and efficient traffic movement. Since freeways provide no access to 
adjoining properties, have no cross traffic and physically separate the two 
directions of movement, engineers were inclined to assume that they must 
necessarily be the safest, most efficient traffic movement device available. If so, 
freeways should be located and designed to ‘carry as many vehicles as possible in 
the most direct, feasible route, between points of demand’.12 The engineers’ 
ideals here also coincided with those of the motoring public who valued the 
ability to travel at high speeds under one’s own control. Many of the difficulties 
and problems associated with mass automobile usage in Sydney, moreover, did 
not become apparent until car numbers started to boom in the 1950s and 1960s, 
and until then cars encountered very little opposition and a great deal of support 
from the general public. Many of those who could not afford a car would have 
bought one if the means had been available. 
Aside from the engineering influence and the popular appeal of motoring, 
the DMR’s attitude to freeways was also given an extra dimension by its 
bureaucratic nature. The ‘expert’ bureaucratic psyche is often extremely 
resistant to change, and even if it is willing to adopt changes, the high cost of 
large programs, some of which may already have been outlaid (for example, for 
property acquisitions or for drawing up detailed plans), makes continuation of 
the programs imperative in order to justify the capital investment promised or 
already outlaid. The Department’s other main pragmatic interest in promoting 
freeways was that it had to compete with other government departments for 
scarce government resources,13 which are allocated in the context of the next 
election. The DMR owed its formation and continuing existence to lobbying 
from other roads interest groups, such as the National Roads and Motorists 
Association (NRMA), insurers, vehicle manufacturers, oil companies and the 
large retail stores for whom greater motor vehicle use means a potentially larger 
customer base. Such organisations have a clear interest in ever increasing the use 
of motor vehicles and therefore of motor vehicle insurance, fuel, new cars and 
spare parts, and the DMR therefore needed to show these groups that it was 
acting with their interests at heart. Consequently, the Department had both a 
12 K. E. Thompson, 'Economic Aspects of Urban Freeways', in Institute of Engineers, 
Proceedings of Symposium 'Are Urban Freeways Really Necessar^.Svdney, 1973,2:6 
13 Andrew Jacubowicz: 'The city game: urban ideology and social conflict’ in Donald Edgar 
(ed.). Social Change in Australia, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1974, 331 
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duty and a need to protect and further private interests rather than to control 
them through public policy. It is therefore not surprising that roads interest 
groups thought that a description of the proposed Sydney freeways read like a 
fairy story’,14 since they were designed to enact their dreams of increased 
automobile use. Although some freeway critics in the 1970s suggested that the 
DMR did not then recognise, as it openly does today,15 that increasing road 
capacity generates more traffic, in view of the argument s widespread currency 
it seems much more likely that the Department understood its truth only too well, 
although it was not in its political interest to say so publicly. Other state planners 
accepted the argument as early as 194816 and numerous supporting studies 
appeared in subsequent years as more experience was gained of the effects of 
freeways on traffic volumes. By the 1970s almost all other traffic planning 
experts were convinced the argument was correct. 
Aside from personal and institutional biases, much of the failure of 
Sydney’s original freeway planners to appreciate the complex problems posed by 
urban freeways can also be traced to the fact that previous large scale road 
development had been focused on country areas, due to the powerful political 
influence of rural interests which have continued to restrict urban road funding 
even to this day. The roadmakers therefore had little or no awareness of the 
detrimental effects of freeway construction on the urban environment. The 
DMR therefore spent nothing, for example, on studying the social cost of 
destroying the ‘slums' which lay in the path of its radial freeways,17 since they 
were assumed to be worthless and undesirable, and next to nothing on 
investigating cheaper alternative transport schemes. 
On the other side of the freeway debate were the users of and lobbyists for 
public transport, the residents of the affected suburbs, and the conservationists. 
Advocates of public transport are subject to many of the same vested interests, 
such as professional advancement, as the promoters of freeways, and the 
provision of adequate and effective public transport throughout a large urban 
region such as Sydney would impose a considerable burden on natural and public 
resources. Freeways and public transport, moreover, do not always conflict 
since fast and efficient roads can, for example, assist public transport by allowing 
the provision of faster bus services. On balance, however, public transport 
supporters were opposed to the proposed super-roads, not only by reason of the 
14 National Roads and Motorists Association, Open Road. August 1949, 
15 On the Road to Nowhere’, Sydney Morning Herald April 9, 1994, 25 
lh Cumberland County Council, Report on the Planning Scheme 166 
17 Hugh Stretton: Ideas for Australian Cities. Georgian House, Melbourne, 1975, 271 
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private car worship implicit in the disparity between the finances being allocated 
to each transportation form (even in the 1974 Sydney Area Transportation Study 
(SATS) the ratio of road funding to public transport funding was 2.5:1), but also 
because the radial freeways were proposed for high density corridors which 
could be served just as well by the existing radial public transport network. 
The radial freeway proposals also met with criticism from residents of the 
areas they affected. Drastic attempts at imposing change on a residential area 
inevitably meet with local criticism, since the inhabitants generally view their 
local environment as an area where they can exercise some degree of autonomy 
in constructing their lives, free from many pressures of outside authorities. 
When existing housing is replaced by any new land use, moreover, it is the 
residents who feel the hidden economic costs. The official 1970s costings for the 
freeways only included the market value of the required house purchases and 
ignored other costs associated with the reallocation of resources, such as: the 
difference, if any, between the market value of the property and the actual 
purchase price; the costs of finding equivalent housing elsewhere; the costs of 
removal; a possible increase in the amount of money spent travelling to and from 
work; and increased rents due to a greater demand for the remaining houses in 
the affected area.18 
More intangibly, forcing people to move to make way for a treeway can 
be extremely socially and personally destructive. Firstly, there were concerns 
about congestion, air and noise pollution from the traffic on the treeway and the 
aesthetics of the freeway structure itself. Secondly, there was concern about 
diminishing local social relationship networks, or communities, built around 
shared locality and cultural heritage. When a treeway is built, those living in its 
path are forced to move elsewhere. Moreover, when a community is diminished 
in size or cultural quality, all its remaining members suffer loss, in proportion to 
the strength of the network, which cannot be prevented, as the DMR suggested, 
by providing links such as footbridges ‘to keep the community together’.19 
Although the freeway supporters argued that communities are constantly 
changing from within anyway,this tails to recognise the greater acceptance ot 
voluntary rather than involuntary change. The latter can seem profoundly 
alienating and depowering, especially if those affected do not feel they have 
contributed to the decision making process. The inner suburban freeway 
18 Planning Research Workshop Pty Ltd, Social Effects of Freeways. 
19 Department of Main Roads official quoted in Andrew Jacubowicz, 
in Institute of Engineers, op cit, 3:10 
March 1979 
'What About the People', 
20 Terence Byrnes, 'The Urban Comprimise', in ibid^ 5:8 
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opponents were not totally opposed to all change, as long as it did not affect them 
in ways which they were not themselves prepared to accept. For example, in 
1970 they successfully suggested that part of the North Western Ireeway be 
located underground.21 
A stronger attack on the idea ot community, however, could have been 
mounted on the grounds that the leaders of the inner-city anti-freeway campaigns 
were newly arrived professionals and therefore that the threatened 
‘communities’ were constructs of the defence movement, but it is equally true 
that older residents appropriated forms of the concept in order to use it 
themselves. There were frequent complaints, for example, from such residents 
being forced to move to new areas where ‘you don’t know nobody’.22 
A more conservative perspective on freeways than that held by local 
residents is that of heritage groups, who are concerned with preserving 
significant links with the continuing past, and environmental conservationists. 
The construction of a radial freeway network brings with it a vast, sudden 
destruction of that portion of the cityscape nearest the points of convergence, 
with the heritage reaction being largely determined by the scale of the 
construction and the perceived historical significance of the area under threat. 
Further, in addition to consuming land space, freeways also generate increased 
usages of fuel resources through encouraging more traffic, with such increases 
being sometimes seen as an unjustifiable expense of natural resources - especially 
in times, such as the 1970s, of perceived resource scarcity. 
Responsibility for deciding between all these competing perspectives rests 
with governments. In Australia, for Constitutional reasons, it is the Federal 
Government which has provided most of the finance for main roads 
construction, either through its own Commonwealth roads program, through 
tied or untied grants to the states or, more recently, through tax concessions to 
private builders. This has been especially true of freeways, which require 
enormous capital investment. The New South Wales State Government was 
responsible for planning and implementing the radial freeway programs, but like 
other State Governments its ability to implement them unconditionally, except 
with the help of private enterprise, has always been extremely limited. 
With rare exceptions, local councils in Australia have traditionally been 
21 Department of Transport Economics, A Discussion Paper of Transport Planning in Svdnev 
to 1975, Australian Government Publishing Service. Melbourne, 1975, 49 
22 Quoted in Jenny Salmon, Forgotten Suburbs. 1987 (video recording) (DPL) 
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deprived of power over regional planning decisions.23 Although local planning 
schemes have been developed from time to time, the State Government approval 
and finance necessary to implement them has been conditional on the local 
council accepting State-initiated public developments.24 State Governments have 
therefore been virtually able to treat local councils just like any other interest 
group. It was only when Leichhardt Council started a public protest campaign 
on behalf of the local residents seeking to stop the radial freeways that local 
government was able to play a significant role in the political planning process 
with which the rest of this paper will be concerned. 
7. (~ire.en~Bans: The Birth of Australian Environmental Politics. A Studjun 
Public Opinion and Participation, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1978, 
24 Wilcox, I aw of 1 and Development, quoted in Roddewig, ibid, 56 
8 
CHAPTER 2 
THE MAIN ROADS GO ON FOREVER 
Governments come and governments go, but the Main Roads go on forever.25 
The one constant planning body during the life of the radial freeway 
proposals was the DMR, which by 1969 had developed into a highly independent 
bureaucracy and had repulsed all challenges to its authority. The Department s 
life-blood was the motor car, and its political power was fundamentally built on 
the rapid growth in the numbers of cars in twentieth century Sydney. Car 
numbers in NSW more than quadrupled between 1950 and 1975, and whereas in 
1920 there were only 16 motor vehicles for every 1000 Australians, by 1980 this 
figure was well over 500.26 
As early as 1919, these trends led to the establishment of a New South 
Wales branch of the National Roads Association (known as the National Roads 
and Motorists Association (NRMA) from 1923). This body aimed to secure the 
establishment of a State main roads body to ensure that motoring interests were 
adequately represented within the Government.27 The NRMA's intensive 
lobbying was decisively boosted in 1924 when the Federal Government made the 
first ever statutory grants to the States specifically for roads.28 Consequently, 
the New South Wales Government came under Federal pressure to establish a 
main roads administration to make it easier to use the Commonwealth's money.29 
Combined with the NRMA's lobbying, the availability of Commonwealth 
money led to the establishment in 1924 of a Main Roads Board (MRB), which 
was given authority over both urban and regional main roads. The MRB was not 
especially successful in improving Sydney's roads network, and groups such as 
the NRMA became increasingly frustrated and pushed for a stronger 
department. These efforts bore fruit with the creation of the DMR in 1932, a 
move which consolidated and strengthened the road lobby's power. The DMR 
was a stronger roads lobby than the MRB in several ways: firstly, the DMR was 
25 Mr Pat Smyth, Chairman of the DMR, 1974, quoted in interview with Tom Uren, Minister 
for Urban and Regional Affairs, 1972-5, April 23, 1994 
26 Peter Spearritt, 'The Privatisation of Australian Passenger Transport', in J. Halligan and C. 
Paris, Towards an Australian Urban Politics. Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1984, 196, 200 
27 Lester Hovenden, 'the Impact of the Motor Vehicle 1900-1939’, in Gary Wotherspoon 
Sydney’s Transport. Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1983, 140 
28 Main Roads Development Act 1924 
29 Minister for Works and Railways, quoted in Ian Manning, The Open Street: Public 
Transport, Motor Cars and Politics in Australian Cities. Transit Australia, Sydney, 1991, 58 
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controlled from its inception by engineers. The first Commissioner was H.H. 
Newell, a Public Works Department engineer and the Assistant Commissioner 
was T.H. Upton, formerly a Senior Lecturer in Engineering from the School of 
Civil Engineering at the University ol Melbourne. Both these men had served on 
the three member MRB. However the third member of the MRB, J. Garlick, 
who had previously been the Under Secretary for Local Government, was not 
appointed to the new Department.30 
Secondly, the substitution of an engineer for a local government 
bureaucrat as DMR head was indicative of its increased power over and 
separation from local government in general. Under the original provisions of 
the Main Roads Act, which gave control over the MRB to the Department of 
Local Government, the Board’s functions were to distribute Government funds 
for work on main roads and to assist and advise councils in the execution of these 
works. Only rarely could the board carry out the work itself.31 In contrast, by 
1932 the Act gave the DMR, as part of the Department of Transport, primary 
responsibility for State Highways and for all proclaimed main roads in the 
County of Cumberland.32 Work on these roads was to be carried out mostly by 
the DMR itself, or else local councils on behalf of and at the direction of the 
Department.33 
Thirdly, the three categories of ‘main roads’ defined in the Act - State 
Highways, Trunk Roads and Ordinary Main Roads - effectively gave the DMR 
control over all important arterial roads in Sydney and throughout the State. 
The DMR, moreover, could add to the network and then proclaim the addition as 
a Main Road. The Board could therefore build and proclaim authority over 
roads virtually anywhere, provided they fitted into the flexible definition of 
‘Main Roads’. While the radial freeways eventually proposed did not fit 
comfortably into any of the existing ‘main roads’ categories, it is indicative of the 
Department’s independence and the political power of the automobile that it was 
able to develop such plans. 
Another related development in the 1930s was the establishment of the 
Town and Country Planning Institute, the first professional planning institute in 
New South Wales. This was set up under the influence largely ol the NSW 
Chapter of the Institute of Architects, but also of DMR engineers. Its president 
30 B. R. Fishburn, The Department of Main Roads, (RTAL), 23 
31 Ibid.. 18 
32 Ibid.,25 
33 Department of Main Roads, Guide to Main Roads Administration for the use of Aldermen 
and Councillors, DMR, Sydney, 1970, 6 
10 
in the late 1930s was senior DMR engineer H.M. Sherrard.34 The professional 
design and construction emphases of each of these groups reinforced each other 
and a modernist planning ideology, in which beauty was a by-product of utility, 
started to become dominant.35 Between 1938 and 1946, spurred on by the new 
ideology and the importance of the car but delayed by World War Two, DMR 
engineers developed the Main Roads Development Plan (MRDP), which was the 
first attempt at formulating a comprehensive, long range plan for urban roads 
(including freeways) in any Australian city.36 Other Australian cities soon took a 
very similar course. 
The MRDP employed methodology which was American in origin. It 
based its findings on a study of ‘the existing transport relation between places of 
living and places of work',37 which was then extrapolated to the year 2000 based 
on an assessment of projected population growth. It claimed to adopt a scientific 
approach,38 but was in fact ideologically and methodologically biased towards 
road development. Although the Department had done little or no analysis of 
public transport use and planning or of land use planning (as opposed to 
describing existing land use), it assumed that land use patterns in Sydney would 
remain static between 1945 and 2000. When the MRDP was formulated the 
Sydney CBD was still the main location of those land uses - places of work and 
shopping - which generate the largest traffic volumes. If this pattern continued, 
the DMR’s proposed freeways would need to carry larger volumes of traffic than 
if those land uses became more decentralised. The greater the traffic volume, the 
greater the need for high capacity roads. It was therefore in the DMR’s interest 
to perpetuate the assumption that Sydney's land use pattern was not to be 
changed. 
The DMR explicitly hoped that the MRDP might be a valuable 
contribution to future urban planning in Sydney.39 What the MRDP did not 
make explicit was that the DMR was attempting to establish for itself a very 
strong position within the planning process. Although it stated that land use 
planning was ultimately the responsibility of the new Cumberland Countv 
Council (CCC)40 and that there needed to be parallel land use and transport 
34 Spearritt, 'Sydney’s Slums’. Labor History. 26, (1974), 73 
35 Sherrard, op cit.. 12 
36 Manning, op cit., 68 
37 Sherrard op cit.. 12 
38 Department of Main Roads, Main Roads Development Plan. 13 
39 Ibid.. 15 
40 Ibid.. 14 
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planning,41 it nevertheless effectively proposed a land use plan of its own. 
The Cumberland County Council was established in 1945 as a condition 
for the states receiving Federal funds for public housing programs. The Council 
had authority to prepare statutory planning schemes ‘regulating and controlling 
the use of land’ by means of maps and ordinances.4* In particular, it had to 
prepare such a plan for Sydney - the first such plan in Australia in the post-war 
years43 - within three years from July 27, 1945. The CCC’s brief made it the 
DMR s first rival Governmental planning body. Despite the size and complexity 
of its task, the Cumberland County Plan (CCP) was duly completed and 
presented to the Minister for Local Government on July 27, 1948.44 
Although the Plan incorporated the MRDP and adopted a similar planning 
ideology to that of the DMR engineers, being described as a democratic medium 
for the pursuit of happiness45 and aiming to plan waste and inefficiency out of 
existence,46 it contained two latent conflicts over freeway planning. Firstly, 
dispersing employment centres to the suburbs would encourage suburban 
sprawl, while the proposed radial freeway network had been designed by the 
DMR on the basis of the land use patterns existing before the decentralisation 
policy began to be implemented. Moreover, the possible effects of 
decentralisation on transport use were not considered. Secondly, the inclusion of 
the MRDP network conflicted with the CCP’s views that mass transport had the 
first claim for use of road space in a redesigned system and that private cars were 
not an efficient form of mass transportation since they consumed vastly more 
road space per passenger.47 Instead of restricting freeway development, 
however, the CCC decided that the solution was to eliminate contact between 
pedestrians and road vehicle streams and thereby to recast the uncontrolled 
pattern of road use ‘to satisfy the needs of the main user groups’.48 This decision 
exposed the CCP to the possibility that use of the private car would annihilate 
41 Ibid. 
42 Quoted in Peter Harrison, Planning the Metropolitan Areas' in I.H. Burnley (ed.). 
Urbanization in Australia: the Post-war Experience. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1974, 203 
43 James Colman: 'Sydney's Second Great Experiment', Australian Quarterly, March 1969, 7 
44 Denis Winston, Sydney's Great Experiment: The Progress of the Cumberland County Plai 
Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1957, 36 
45 Cumberland County Council, Report on the Planning Scheme, xv 
46 Cumberland County Council, You and the County Plan, 1945, 2 
47 Cumberland County Council, Report on the Planning Scheme, 167 
48 Quoted in Peter Spearritt and Christina DeMarco. Planning Sydney's Future, Allen and 
Unwin, Sydney, 1988, 19 
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public transport. 
The fundamental shortcoming in the CCP was that the scale of population 
growth which occurred over the next twenty years was far greater than it 
envisaged. The resultant pressures to open up new subdivisions more quickly 
than was planned and to release land within the green belt and beyond, thereby 
undermining the social ideals of the CCC planners, led to rapid suburban sprawl 
and therefore to social inequalities arising from unequal ownership of the means 
of production.49 One example of this was the way in which the land distribution 
schemes in the CCP served as speculators’ guides, informing investors in urban 
land where to buy next in order to make quick profits.50 Such inequalities were 
the opposite ol what the CCC planners had intended and began to destroy the 
philosophical credibility of their plan and its freeways. 
The CCC planners, mindful of the risks posed by other influences on the 
planning process, had recognised from the start that the greatest fault in previous 
Government planning had been the ‘lack of co-ordination’.51 Most authorities 
had planned parochially, with no regard to overall regional requirements.52 
Their starting assumption that the CCC could achieve co-ordination,53 however, 
was far too optimistic. It ignored the reality that the Council was a politically 
feeble institution. The CCC did not directly advise the Minister for Local • 
Government, who was the final arbiter of planning objectives. His main advisers 
were officers of his department and of the Town and Country Planning Advisory 
Committee (TCPAC),54 both of which had been deprived of fuller town planning 
powers by the local government opposition to the original version of the 1945 
legislation and were therefore hostile towards the CCC. The CCC, moreover, 
was hampered by being beholden to local government. Its component local 
council members tended to act in support of local rather than regional authority, 
and at least one councillor who took a broader metropolitan view was not re¬ 
elected by the local councils he represented.55 Further, the 1945 Act gave the 
thirty-nine local councils in the CCC area the responsibility for drawing up 
detailed land use plans for their own territory within the parameters of the 
49 Sandercock 'Urban Policy', in B. Head and A Patience 
Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1979, 145 
50 Ibid.. 144 
(ed.). From Whitlam to Fra^r 
Cumberland County Council, Statement on the Planning Scheme 3 
52 Cumberland County Council, Report on the Planning Scheme 4 
53 Cumberland County Council, Statement on the Planning 3 
^ Department of Transport Economics, op cit.. 24-27 
55 Sandercock, Cities lor Sale. Heineman, London. 1978, 180 
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Cumberland County Plan, but only a handful of councils complied.56 Most 
preferred to resist CCC interference in what they saw as local issues to be 
determined by local means. 
In this climate, other state government authorities were willing and able to 
out-muscle the CCC in pursuit of their own agendas. This was especially true of 
the DMR which already had substantial experience in road planning. Although 
the first Chief County Planner appointed by the State Government, Mr S.L. 
Luker, was a former DMR officer, and although much of the DMR’s planning 
section was transferred to the CCC,57 the two institutions always had an uneasy 
association. The DMR only supported adoption of the CCP provided that the 
Plan’s function was simply to protect the Department’s proposals.58 The CCC, 
however, felt that main roads construction or widening should only occur if it 
did not conflict with the implementation of the CCP.59 As Sydney’s growth 
proceeded contrary to and beyond the CCC’s control over subsequent years, 
objections to the DMR’s freeways began to mount within the Council. Although 
the CCP was statutory, the CCC planners were arguing by 1955 that their plans 
should be ‘flexible, constantly under review, and amendable in the light of 
properly conducted surveys’.60 They began to support and accept the reality of a 
more rapid pace of decentralisation. 
The DMR, however, sought to cope with decentralisation not by altering 
its existing freeway proposals but by planning additions to the system. Acting 
independently of the CCC, it engaged American engineering consultants De 
Leuw Cather (DLC) to review the existing freeway plans. Their August 1961 
report, based on essentially the same research techniques as the MRDP, 
confirmed the DMR’s existing plans and recommended the addition of another 
150 miles of freeways to the 1946 network.61 The CCC opposed these 
recommendations and called for a comprehensive review of the transport 
requirements of Sydney in relation to those land use changes which had taken 
56 Harrison, Planning the Metropolitan Areas. 205 
57 P. Wilenski, Public Power and Public Administration. Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1986, 
242 
58 Secretary, Department of Main Roads, to Chief County Planner, Cumberland County 
Council, June 8, 1948 (CCCF 79) 
59 Chief County Planner, Cumberland County Council letter to The Secretary, Department of 
Main Roads, August 6, 1948 (CCCF 79) 
60 Cumberland County Council, Progress Report, CCC, Sydney, 1955, 3 
61 De Leuw Cather, Report on Geometric Design Study, Sydney Urban Expressways, DLC, 
San Francisco, 1961 
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place since the CCP and which could be expected in the future.62 
Tensions between the DMR and the CCC were heightened by newly 
developing anti-freeway arguments which were supported by Luker’s successor 
as CCC head, Mr Rod Fraser. Fraser argued from overseas experience that 
building freeways could never meet the ever increasing demand for them, that 
the DLC report had ignored the complex inter-relationship between land use and 
transportation, and in particular the way in which the metropolitan transport 
system had moved away from being predominantly radial in response to the 
development of complex focal points for destinations across the whole 
metropolitan area.63 Since public transport was at its best and cars at their worst 
in serving the high density CBD of a large city, he called for the much greater 
use of public transport to cater tor peak hour commuter trips into the CBD as a 
means of solving the central area transport problems caused by automobile 
congestion.64 The CCC concurred with Fraser’s views,65 which also gained 
support from some planning academics, such as Dennis Winston.6h Other town 
planning experts, however, most notably Ross Blunden whose Chair of Traffic 
Engineering at the University of New South Wales was set up by the sponsorship 
of the DMR in the 1950s, considered freeways a sound investment.67 
In the event, political designs both overtook Fraser’s position and allowed 
the DLC Report to slide into political oblivion.68 The CCC was abolished in 1963 
and replaced by the State Planning Authority (SPA).69 The structure of the SPA 
largely alienated Sydney local councils from the urban planning process and 
consolidated the institutional power of the State bureaucracy. On the 
administrative side, a planner from the Department of Local Government, Mr 
C.E. Ferrier, was appointed as Chief Planner. Rod Fraser, who also applied for 
the job, was never given a top position within the new authority, and he soon 
resigned altogether. It is quite possible that objections to his criticism of 
62 Rod Fraser, Examination of Aspects of Metropolitan Planning Significance in the De Leuw 
Cather Company's Report on Geometric Design Study. Sydney Urban Expressways. CCC. 
Sydney, 1964 
63 Ibid.. 4 
64 Ibid.. 17-18 
65 Cumberland County Council, Economics of Urban Expansion. 1958 
66 Denis Winston, Sydney Expressways: Comments on the Report bv De Leuw Cather. 
University of Sydney, 1962 
67 'Acclaim for Roads Scheme', Telegraph Mirror. November 11, 1961 
68 In 1968 the DMR still regarded a map of the MRDP (M.P. 180) dated June 1952 as current 
DMR file 43M380, part 5. 1968, SAA, Box K294149 
69 Department of Transport Economics, op cit.. 27 
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freeways were a contributing factor in these outcomes, and it may also be 
significant that most copies of his 1964 report critical of the DLC report were 
mysteriously destroyed before he could distribute them to all local councils.70 
Five years and a change of government later, the SPA produced the 
Sydney Region Outline Plan (SROP). In contrast to the detailed rigidity of the 
CCP, the SROP regularly declared itself as a non-statutory flexible outline of 
‘principles, policies and broad strategy’,71 designed for a dynamic, not static, 
situation. The SROP philosophy, however, still reflected a planning vacuum, 
like that of the CCC era, which the individual departmental bureaucracies, with 
their much greater policy leverage and spending power,72 could independently 
exploit. This problem was particularly acute in transport, which was 
inadequately treated in the SROP on the basis that the data necessary to define 
specific proposals for Sydney’s greatly expanded metropolitan area had not yet 
been fully collected or analysed.73 In failing to deal more decisively with 
transport strategy, the SPA abrogated its responsibility to set guidelines for the 
DMR’s activities. The DMR’s proposals were given extra credibility (when they 
should have been doubted) by dint of their inclusion in the CCP, and the SPA 
accepted that the DMR could determine which of the proposals should be 
regarded as reasonably firm commitments for future regional planning 
purposes.74 The SPA then used these as a starting assumption in formulating the 
SROP.75 
By the end of the 1960s, therefore, through a combination of its own 
institutional solidity and influence and of the administrative weaknesses inherent 
in the CCC and then the SPA, the DMR was a law unto itself. The institutional 
power of the car during the 1960s can be clearly seen in the matter of freeway 
funding, which doubled in real terms during the decade,76 and also in the 
establishment in 1965 of the Commonwealth Bureau ot Roads (CBR), which had 
responsibility for advising the Federal Government how best to spend the 
substantial sums of money now being given by the Federal government for road 
70 v $400,000 Traffic Plan Scandal’, Daily Tele mink, March 13, 1966 
71 State Planning Authority, Sydney Region Outline Plan,.March 1968, 18 
72 Planning and Environment Commission, Sydney Region Outline, Plan Review, PEC, 
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construction. The 1969 Commonwealth Aid Roads Agreement increased the 
funds available for urban roads development by one third, with almost all of the 
increase to be spent on freeway land resumption and construction.77 The DMR at 
last had the money required to build the remainder of its inner city freeways, and 
announced that work on the first stage of the North-Western Freeway, between 
the CBD and Bridge Road, Glebe, would start immediately for completion by 
1978.78 However, although it also had formidable institutional power and the 
support of the State Askin Liberal Government, which favoured the land use 
ideology in vogue since 1945 and the right of individuals to use whichever mode 
of transport they wished, more formidable external opposition was starting to 
emerge. 
77 Ibid.. 83 
78 $30 million Expressway for Sydney', Sydney Monuno H,r„U (LL . undated) 
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CHAPTER 3 
AS A CITY GROWS 
As a city grows, man may either add to or subtract from what he has done 
Great cities reflect the successful adaptation over time of a series of 
different cultural values.79 
DMR proposals, whether for inner suburban freeways through Glebe or 
for lesser distributor roads through Paddington,80 were not the only foci of 
union and local residential political protest and organisation in Sydney in the late 
1960s and early 1970s.81 The other main sources of conflict were housing 
projects and other similar redevelopment projects. In all cases, the residents 
involved wanted to preserve their living environment as it was and to have their 
voices heard in the planning process. Frustration at their inability to do so 
through existing institutional means led them to take matters into their own 
hands.82 
While there were attempts to establish city-wide umbrella groups, such as 
the Coalition of Resident Action Groups (CRAG), to foster co-operation between 
different resident groups, these largely failed due to the wide spectrum of class 
interests and ideologies they represented.83 Most opposition was conducted on 
the basis of individual regions or issues. 1970s resident opposition to the radial 
freeways emerged mainly in the Leichhardt Municipality, but also in other 
suburbs, such as Willoughby, Hunters Hill and Lane Cove, affected by the North 
Western or Warringah Expressways. The inner-most section of the Warringah 
Expressway, however, had already been built and Lane Cove and Hunters Hill 
were not scheduled to be affected until the 1980s.84 The only area in which an 
inner section of radial freeway was scheduled for construction in the early part 
of the 1970s was the inner west, and this area therefore provided the main 
crucible in which opposition ignited. 
79 A.C. Strachan (President of the Civic Design Society and Glebe resident since 1971), The 
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The politically important groups fighting the freeways were those which 
could effectively co-ordinate an opposition campaign, manipulate the media and 
give the impression for the media and the authorities that the anti-freeway 
protest was supported by the whole community and was not the work of isolated 
disruptive and disreputable trouble-makers. Although the campaign’s unity was 
fundamentally due to their common goal of halting the DMR’s proposals, the 
particular nature of Sydney s inner western suburbs and their politics posed 
crucial problems and opportunities for those seeking to reverse the 
Government’s freeway policy. 
Between 1900 and the 1950s, Sydney’s inner suburbs had become largely 
populated by people living on low incomes in small and often cramped 
accommodation units.85 These conditions were abhorred not only by planning 
ideologues, but also by working class organisations such as the Bricklayers and 
Carpenters’ Union which in 1937 called for kan immediate campaign to abolish 
slum areas and build better homes for the workers’.86 Impetus for inner-city 
residential revival did not arrive until the unexpected rapid post-war increase in 
Sydney’s population. In particular, many newly arrived migrants from Britain 
and from Southern Europe,87 together with the elderly and University of Sydney 
students and academics, moved into the vacated inner western residences. Much 
of the inner suburban housing stock was renovated as the financially constrained 
migrants enacted European values concerning the inner city. They revitalised 
the area and rendered the CCP an outdated blueprint for these suburbs.88 
As decentralisation continued, however, especially in the manufacturing 
industry, migrants were lured out into suburbia and were replaced by a rapidly 
increasing number of professionals and other white collar workers.89 As these 
groups moved in, house price rises in suburbs such as Paddington, initially, then 
Redfern, Balmain and Glebe outstripped rises across the remainder of the city.90 
The price rises were accompanied by sharp rises in housing stock turnover and in 
the level of renovation activity.91 In many cases, especially on the Glebe Point 
85 'The Freeway Dream Sours', The Bulletin. August 11, 1973 
86 Spearritt, Sydney’s Slums. 69 
87 H. Kendig, New Life for Old Suburbs. Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1979, 110 
88 Andrew Jacubowicz, 'A New Politics of Suburbia’, Current Affairs Bulletin. April 1 197~> 
341 * 
89 Kendig, op cit., 125 
90 Ibid.. 154 
91 Ibid.. 155-7 
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and Toxteth estates92 in Glebe, renovation restored terrace houses which had 
been converted into single rented rooms back to their former condition.93 
The attractions ot suburbs such as Glebe, Balmain and Paddington for 
significant numbers ot professionals and their ilk were very complex. The 
numbers of white collar jobs in the city and inner suburbs had grown 
enormously throughout the 1950s and 1960s. New suburban housing locations 
were now further removed from the city centre, and the relatively cheap prices 
of inner suburban housing, which could then be renovated, were attractive to 
those people, especially those who were products of the ‘baby boom’, who 
consciously wanted to reject the suburban lifestyle (and its associated 
commuting).94 
Since the ideology of suburbia was grounded in the post-war urban 
planning ideal, moreover, rejecting suburbia entailed rejecting that ideal. Far 
from being tainted by the ‘slum’ stigma, terrace housing became a fashion 
symbol amongst its new occupants. Simultaneously, a new appreciation for the 
city’s heritage and environment began to emerge as an antidote to the side-effects 
of ‘progress’, which included the deteriorating public environment.95 The year 
of the first sustained development of Glebe (1968) also saw the formation of the 
Glebe Society, the area’s first residents’ association.96 Its participants were the 
new professional residents and academics, and its first President was Bernard 
Smith, Professor of Fine Arts at Sydney University.97 Like its next-door 
counterpart, the Annandale Association (formed in 1970), the Society was 
ostensibly a conservative social and recreational club, organising activities such 
as bushwalks, arts and crafts sales, Christmas parties and local history tours.98 
Despite its pretence of being ‘apolitical’, however, it also had more action- 
orientated functions, aiming to ensure adequate planning and to preserve places 
of historic interest within the suburbs.99 The Society was particularly concerned 
with the DMR’s freeway proposals and with the possibility that large blocks ot 
92 M. McAllister, Community Organization and Local Politics in Glebe, Community Politics 
research project, Government III, University of Sydney, 1975, 3 
93 Kendig, op cit, 127 
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flats would be built in the area.100 Moreover, its members had the means and the 
opportunity to fight for their aims against the encroaching developments, which 
would also have had significant adverse effects on the value of the locals real 
estate . Many of those campaigning against the freeways held salaried jobs - in 
large corporations, the public service and the universities - which were well paid 
and relatively free of job insecurity.101 They could therefore afford to devote 
time and other resources, both financial and intellectual,102 to the fight. 
When the DMR commenced purchasing houses in Glebe, one broader 
strategy employed by members of the Glebe Society and a number of university 
students103 was to form the Glebe Anti-Expressway Action Group (GAEAG) to 
alert the public to the threat of the freeway proposals.104 GAEAG attracted 
members of a more ‘radical’ political persuasion and was the ‘grass-roots 
activist wing of the residents’ organisation. Its members engaged in concerted 
door-knocking, letterbox dropping, postering and letter writing, and generally 
tried to get the message out amongst the people. Their periodic newsletters, 
distributed by letterbox dropping, kept residents informed of the latest 
developments.105 The rhetoric of the early newsletters was extremely socialist 
and anti-American, viewing the Australian Government as dominated by 
American automotive monopolies,106 but as the freeway threat became more 
imminent the later publications largely ignored ideology and instead made 
pragmatic appeals to all local residents regardless of ideological leanings. The 
newsletters also constantly encouraged participation (‘there's lots of things we 
can do’) and outlined future strategies and visions for action, including rallies 
and marches.107 According to spokesperson Patsi Dunn, it was ‘most important 
for the people of Glebe to realise how much can be achieved through community 
solidarity'.108 Members of GAEAG were behind a number of attention grabbing 
activities designed to get maximum publicity for the anti-freeway cause, such as 
postering anti-freeway slogans over advertising billboards along Victoria Road, 
100 Department of Housing and Construction, Glebe Project. 27 
101 Jacubowicz, A New Politics of Suburbia. 340 
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White Bay.109 GAEAG allowed the minority of Glebe Society and Annandale 
Association members who so desired to take ‘radical’ action without diminishing 
the amenity societies’ image ol respectability. The extent of such action under 
the Glebe Society or Annandale Association banners was much more limited.110 
The activist members ol the Glebe Society also extended their strategies to 
Leichhardt Council politics. The council had long been controlled by the three 
right-wing local branches ol the Labor Party, which conducted local council 
politics on a Tammany Hall machine and boss system and which had failed to 
mount substantial opposition to the housing and freeway development proposed 
for the area. In the early 1970s the Glebe Society became increasingly frustrated 
at the Council’s inertia and organised the Campaign for Better Council (CBC) 
which won six of the twelve places on the Council at the October 1971 elections 
on a platform of protecting the lifestyle of the new class of residents and stopping 
the radial freeways.* * 111 The other places were taken by four of the previous nine 
Labor aldermen and by Izzy Wyner and Nick Origlass. Wyner and Origlass, 
strong participants in the Left wing of Labor Politics, had recently been expelled 
from the Australian Labor Party (ALP) after voting against a right-wing caucus 
decision and had subsequently constructed the independent Balmain Leichardt 
Labor Party, drawing support from the new professionals and from their old 
Labor supporters. Consequently, Origlass was politically bound on his election 
as Mayor to act in line with the strategies and tactics of the new residents’ groups. 
This outcome came at the expense of the local ALP right wing who only agreed 
to support the anti-freeway campaign after much deliberation.112 
In November 1971, at a meeting attended by 700 people,113 the Council 
formed the Leichhardt Anti-Urban Radial Expressway Committee (LAUREC). 
Chaired by Mayor Origlass, this group existed kto organise petitions and other 
manifestations of public disquiet’.114 Through LAUREC, the residents put their 
new-found (largely symbolic) power to good use through a series ot high 
publicity meetings and marches. During these activities, such as a rowdy protest 
march of 300 people through Glebe on February 12, 1972,115 they were careful 
to portray themselves as respectable citizens who were so outraged by the 
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proposals that they were prepared to use shock publicity tactics, such as using 
water-based paints to daub footpaths, roads, buildings and cars in the future path 
of the freeway, to register their dissent. The image of the Mayor, in full 
ceremonial regalia, joining in the painting spree was crucial to this portrayal, 
with the marchers quickly dispersing when Origlass was not present.116 
Although led by the new middle class, older working class residents also 
began to participate in the anti-freeway movement as they were persuaded by the 
informative educational activities of the middle class and student activists to take 
up the campaign as their own cause outside the Labor machine. By 1975, 36% of 
Glebe residents thought they could influence the planning process.11'7 The 
freeway proposals, which since 1968 had become the most pressing issue in the 
municipality, threatened the lifestyles ot all Glebe residents and ditw together 
the whole diversity of the suburb in opposing the DMR. Judging by the problems 
experienced a few’ years later by GRAG, it would have been impossible to do this 
if the main threat had been the construction of blocks of flats. In this case, the 
middle class would have been the main group affected and those less well off 
and/or more radically inclined could have complained, as they did in other areas 
such as Potts Point, of selfish exclusivism. 118 
For all its skilful organisation and presentation as a unified, 
comprehensive, intelligent movement, however, the residents' opposition 
campaign by itself could not have made much impact on the State Government or 
on the DMR bureaucracy's political power. The residents were an interest group 
from a safe Labor seat trying to attract the attention of a Liberal State 
Government. Moreover, there was no procedure established at State 
Government level for listening to representations by resident groups on planning 
issues. Meetings of the SPA were closed and the reports of its chief planners 
were not public documents. For the SPA and its Minister, its broad long term 
advisory planning, generated by top level policies, was ‘not ripe for public 
knowledge' and there was no justification for disclosure.119 In such an 
institutional climate, the residents needed a way of making an impact on the 
SPA’s plan formulation in order to complement their direct public campaign. 
They were therefore fortunate to find - in the Builders Labourers' Federation 
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(BLF) and the Federal Labor Party - allies who could make such an impact. 
According to Jack Mundey, who headed the Sydney BLF between 1969 
and 1974 and who coined the phrase ‘green bans’, the imposition of such bans 
showed that a growing number of workers were demanding a greater say, a 
greater control, over their working lives and were insisting that the work 
performed should be beneficial to the community as a whole.120 Although the 
buoyancy of the construction industry in the early 1970s meant that the bans 
could be selectively imposed without threatening members’ employment, the 
BLF under Mundey developed the concept of the moral agency of unions much 
further than it had ever previously gone. With other unions remaining 
preoccupied with traditional concerns, moreover, the bans were not merely 
opportunistic. 
Developers, the Government and the establishment press such as the 
Sydney Morning Herald sought to portray the BLF, and the one or two other 
unions121 which took similar action, as disruptive radicals whose attempts to set 
themselves up as the arbiters of taste and protectors of national heritage were at 
best comical122 and at worst abhorrent. The union also felt the class conflict 
implicit in such critiques, which were also fed by a fear campaign based on the 
avowed communism of the NSW and Victorian BLF executives. The NSW 
executive’s environmentalism, however, won out over class conflict,123 while 
their commitment to radical democracy led to the adoption of the requirements 
for involvement that a resident group had to request help and that the request had 
to be approved at a local public meeting.124 In the case of the freeway bans, the 
Leichhardt residents left the BLF with little doubt about the level of support they 
enjoyed. The bans the Union imposed severely inhibited the ability of the DMR 
to proceed with its necessary demolition work without the use of ‘scab' labour, 
which was vigorously resisted. More importantly, they also generated intense 
publicity for the anti-freeway movement and further invigorated the freeway 
debate by forcing state planners to take notice of resident opposition. 
The philosophies held by the residents and the BLF also converged with 
the attitudes of the Federal ALP. Gough Whitlam and Tom Uren, the major 
120 Peter Thomas, Taming the Concrete Jungle: The Builders Labourers Story. NSWBLF. 
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urban planning protagonists for the Labor Party,12n both lived in and 
represented outer-suburban electorates of Sydney,126 and the urban policies they 
developed were partly a personal response to the infrastructure problems of 
these areas. By 1972, the Federal ALP succeeded in establishing city planning 
and urban ‘quality of life’ throughout Australia’s urban regions as the major 
election issue,127 the scale of which called for large-scale federal intervention.128 
In these respects, Federal Labor's urban reform efforts were a return to 
the democratic ethos of the Cumberland County Plan, but with radically 
different concrete planning consequences. Labor's election chances were further 
strengthened after the incumbent Liberal Prime Minister William McMahon 
decided not to set up an independent urban development department and to leave 
the States with the responsibility, theoretically, for the planning and development 
of major population centres.129 Labor was duly elected and the new Department 
of Urban and Regional Development (DURD), with Uren as its dedicated 
Minister, was soon established to implement the Whitlam and Uren agenda. 
DURD’s transport planning was intended to avoid ‘technocratic 
isolation'130 through educating all parties in broader perspectives on the issues at 
stake.131 Moreover, integrating and encouraging action at all levels of 
government through co-ordination and communication was ‘the most vital aspect 
of the Department's task'. In contrast to the separateness of the DMR. DURD 
thought that planning had to proceed from the assumption that transport, far 
from being totally dependent on other forms of land use, was one of the most 
influential factors within urban and regional systems.132 In Uren’s view, the 
proposed radial freeways would not improve the communities through which 
they would pass and would eventually lead to more problems than their 
proponents claimed they would solve. They would force poorer inner suburban 
125 Daily Telegraph, June 19, 1972, quoted in C.N. Lloyd and P.N. Trov. Federal Power in 
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residents to move into even more seriously disadvantaged outer suburbs, would 
aggravate over-building in the central areas of the city133 and would do nothing 
to alleviate problems such as pollution while at the same time destroying the 
inner suburbs’ social fabric. 
The anti-freeway activities of Uren and DURD reflected a unique and 
novel government approach to planning issues. Uren began to cast himself as a 
national figurehead for urban planning reform and maintained close contact with 
the resident activists through Dick Smythe, the Head of DURD’s transport 
division. Although in one sense the Labor party at the state and federal levels had 
little to gain locally from taking up the residents’ specific cause (because the 
battle was taking place in already safe Labor seats), the Federal Government's 
stated urban agenda, combined with the high grass roots profile which the local 
opposition groups raised throughout Australia’s cities, compelled Uren to 
become involved with the freeway opposition. If built, the freeways would have 
consumed resources better spent in servicing the more disadvantaged areas of the 
metropolis and would have deprived the inner suburbs of low income housing 
and urban amenity. The plans which were thought to promote equality in the 
1940s clearly no longer did so in the 1970s and had no regard tor the newly 
emerged importance of urban heritage and the environment. 
133 The Bulletin, op cjt., 12 
CHAPTER 4 
CONCERN AND COMPASSION 
The geographical focal point of confrontation over the radial freeways in 
1970s Sydney was the area between Harris Street, Ultimo, and Bridge Road, 
Glebe, which included the historic nineteenth century home of Lyndhurst,1 34 
other homes largely occupied by tenants, and Wentworth Park. I his area was 
the only inner-suburban location in which freeway construction was planned for 
the early 1970s and the DMR would have had ample time to pass the point of no 
return in building the North-Western freeway had the local residents not 
campaigned so vigorously against it. Throughout 1971 the residents became 
increasingly concerned at the way in which the DMR was either ignoring or 
stifling their voice. For example, during that year the Department decided, in 
full consultation with the Department of Lands and the Trustees of Wentworth 
Park,135 for whom the Park's greyhound track provided a major source of 
income, to alter the freeway’s proposed route to avoid interference with the 
track. This decision, which was taken without even informing local residents,136 
was justified on the grounds that it gave the freeway a better and cheaper 
alignment, but it also increased the number of low-income households whose 
houses were scheduled for demolition and would have devastated a greater 
percentage of the Park's public recreation area.137 The DMR also pursued a 
policy of either demolishing their acquisitions or left uninhabitable for sustained 
periods of time. By November 1971, GAEAG was employing measures such as 
pickets and re-occupation ‘flying squads' in order to prevent and defy evictions. 
Several confrontations between residents, police and demonstrators occurred 
into 1972. The resultant publicity, together with the impact of the green bans, 
soon led to the DMR temporarily withdrawing from Glebe.138 
Also around this time more and more planners, including Professor 
Blunden, started criticising the DMR s proposals, essentially on the basis that by 
the 1970s the rise of the automobile, far from being desirable, was now choking 
the very cities it was designed to serve and therefore had to be curtailed or 
134 Glebe Anti-Expressway Action Group, Where do we go from here’7. August 1972 flyer 
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halted. These arguments were taken up by the BLF and by the residents, who 
claimed that the DMR’s radial treeway scheme had been demonstrated by 
overseas experience, especially in America, to be neither economic nor a 
solution to traffic problems.139 At the Federal level, Tom Uren, who had a 
policy ot talking 'with grassroots people’ and reacting 'to some of their requests’ 
it he thought they were right,140 pledged his opposition to the DMR’s radial 
proposals as early as February 1972.141 Meanwhile, the residents continued to 
pursue their own confrontational and publicity grabbing strategies. In August 
1972, for example, they decided to commence construction of a children’s 
adventure playground on the derelict blocks of land and to begin holding 
opposition meetings in an empty flour factory in Bridge Road which was owned 
by the DMR. The adventure playground became a symbol of resistance against 
the DMR’s environmental destruction, especially as the Department successfully 
used the area as a rubbish dump. As the residents were gradually driven out, 
however, by the end of 1972 the focus of anti-freeway activity had shifted to 
government battles. 
While the external opposition was mobilising in 1970-1972, however, the 
State Liberal Government and monolithic bureaucracies continued to develop 
their thinking along the same paths as before. In 1970, to remedy the omission ot 
a detailed strategic transport plan from the SROP, the State Government 
commissioned the Sydney Area Transportation Study. SATS was overseen by 
the County of Cumberland Transport Advisory Council (CUMTAC), which 
consisted of senior bureaucrats from Treasury, the SPA, the DMR and the 
Departments of Motor and Government Transport. CUMTAC employed a 
decision by consensus ethos, which meant that its decisions tended to reflect the 
power held by each of its constituent bodies. The SATS study, which was 
undertaken by a group of transport economists and highway engineers,142 led by 
Dr Robert Neilsen, therefore adopted essentially the same transport planning 
technique used to develop the MRDP and failed to recognise that different 
transport networks induce different patterns ot land use. Although given the 
opportunity to evaluate the transport consequence of alternative land 
use/transportation plans, SATS in fact only analysed three minor variations of 
the SROP.143 Since the SROP still placed the Sydney CBD as the largest 
139 'Mayor warns on expressway', The Glebe, October 14, 1971 
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employment district in a Sydney area whose population was anticipated to 
undergo still further expansion, it was predictable that SA I S should eventually 
recommend retaining the existing network and making middle and outer suburb 
additions. 
Pending the SATS findings, both the Liberal State Government and the 
DMR continued to stonewall the freeway opposition groups and to treat them 
with contempt. The Department was extremely reluctant to answer questions 
relating to its internal structure, its planning techniques and its decision-making 
processes,144 and its refusal to acknowledge perspectives which conflicted with 
its aims meant that such official dialogue as took place between opposition groups 
and the DMR was inevitably conducted at cross-purposes. In State Parliament, 
meanwhile, Premier Askin trusted the DMR145 and attempted to conclude the 
debate prematurely by doubting that SATS would recommend changes to the 
freeway proposals. Such statements exasperated the freeway opponents, who in 
1971 and 1972 found a new source of hope - the state ALP opposition which 
previously had always been in favour of the freeways.146 ALP politicians such as 
Peter Cox now argued in terms of the people's right to be heard147 and of the 
inappropriateness of freeways as a means of social reform or of solving Sydney's 
transport problems. Whereas in the early 1960s the ALP was calling for the 
acceleration of the freeway program so that the redevelopment of housing 
commission land in Glebe could occur, by 1971 it was arguing that ‘you do not 
have progress by forcing people from their homes’.148 
Labor's concern turned the freeways into a significant party political 
issue, an outcome which was followed in 1973 by criticism of the freeway plans 
by the Minister for Transport and by CUMTAC. Both were frustrated at the 
DMR's continuing bureaucratic independence. Also in 1973, the Whitlam 
Government took its first action against inner-city freeways by establishing 
several inquiries into aspects of Australian road development. The CBR 
produced several reports, culminating in early 1974, which opposed inner city 
freeways on the grounds of the high community impact of freeways in densely 
developed areas and of the high cost of property acquisition and freeway 
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construction in these areas.149 The CBR recommended that Sydney’s radials be 
replaced by circumferential roads. Its reports were soon followed by a 
bipartisan House of Representatives Select Committee on Road Safety concluding 
that devoting the same funds proposed for expenditure on freeways either to 
upgrading the existing road system or to improving public transport would 
achieve a much higher safety return much more quickly.159 
One month later, in March 1974, the Federal Government purchased the 
Glebe Estate from the Church of England, thereby preventing the North- 
Western freeway from proceeding. Perhaps more significantly, the 
Commonwealth Roads Grants Act of September 1974 cut the federal funding 
available for urban arterial roads by over 50%, based on a change in emphasis 
away from urban freeways towards inter-capital routes and on the Whitlam 
Government s general dislike of disproportionate spending on private over 
public transport. Further, the Act allowed the Commonwealth to reduce grants 
to any state which continued with road construction of which Canberra did not 
approve, even if it were financed by state funds. 
The impact of this series of interfering Federal Government actions, 
combined with the savaging151 that the hopelessly obsolete and inadequate SATS 
report received when it was published in 1974, inflamed the DMR to drastic 
action. Eleven days after the federal funding agreement, and two years after the 
last demolitions in Glebe, the DMR suddenly moved to demolish a hotel in Fig 
Street, Ultimo and then bulldoze houses further down the street. Although 
LAUREC had become defunct at the end of 1973 when the amenities groups lost 
control of Leichhardt Council and Origlass ceased to be mayor, and although 
GAEAG had also ceased to function in the belief that the freeway threat had been 
averted,152 the more stable amenities groups harvested the fruits of the anti¬ 
freeway publicity by hurriedly organising a large demonstration for Monday 
September 30 and preparing for sit-ins. Many protesters were dressed in suits to 
create an image of respectability. Officials of the BLF, who were called on for 
support, placed a green ban on continued work on the freeway in Ultimo. As 
demolition workers were deployed, demonstrators barricaded themselves into 
the buildings, climbed on the roofs and chimneys, and sat down in front of the 
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bulldozers.153 In response, the police moved in to remove the demonstrators and 
the ensuing clashes resulted in twenty arrests. 
The Fig St confrontation indicated that education was more crucial to 
potent resident opposition than good organisation, but also highlighted the 
importance of continued willingness to engage in high profile confrontation. 
The conflict received national media attention154 and the protesters received 
statements of support from DURD.155 At a public meeting at Fig Street on 
October 5 1974, moreover, the State opposition leader, Neville Wran, pledged 
his opposition to the freeway.156 The DMR, now fearful of the ugly publicity it 
was receiving, agreed to stop demolition until a funding agreement could be 
reached with the Federal Government. No such agreement was ever reached, 
DURD commissioned a study of alternatives, and work in Ultimo remained 
stopped. 
The events of early October 1974 were the climax of external opposition 
to the State Government's freeway plans. Although LAUREC, minus the 
Council, was resurrected as the Anti-Urban Radial Expressway Committee 
(AUREC), AUREC convenor Allan Sorrenson was soon confident that there was 
no further threat to Glebe. By the middle of 1975 there was again no longer any 
anti-freeway organisation as such, although Sorrenson incorporated its aims into 
his newly convened Save Public Transport Committee.157. The year 1975 also 
saw the demise of radical pressure from Canberra and the BLF as the Fraser 
Liberal Government repudiated Whitlam's grand urban solutions and 
interventionalist centralism158 and as the power base of the activist NSW branch 
headed by Mundey was destroyed by a new state branch of the Federal BLF 
headed by Norm Gallagher. The new BLF would only impose a green ban if it 
was based on the intrinsic historic value of a building, or an a request by the 
respected National Trust that a ban be imposed, in each case supported by the 
general public rather than organised residents' groups.159 
In the aftermath of Fig Street, however, there were signs that the State 
Government mind-set was changing in response to external pressure, to 
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awareness of the scarcity of energy resources world-wide and to Labor’s 
growing electoral popularity. The Planning and Environment Commission 
replaced the SPA and in December 1974 produced a report recommending 
integrating land use and transportation planning, strengthening local planning 
decision making, giving greater emphasis to environmental considerations in 
planning, paying greater attention to the social and economic consequences of 
planning and opening up all stages of the planning process to full public 
involvement.160 In late 1975 the government also undertook a review of policy 
on freeway planning and construction which recognised the constraints imposed 
by the effects of freeway land acquisition on urban areas.161 The review made no 
specific recommendations about inner-urban freeways,162 however, and they 
were not finally abandoned until the Wran Labor government, elected in March 
1976, had undertaken its own reviews.163 
As well as abandoning the radial freeways, the new government decided 
that the acknowledged transport problem along Victoria Road was to be solved 
by the construction of a new Glebe Island Bridge and several grade-separated 
interchanges between Pyrmont and Gladesville.164 This proposal was formulated 
by the DMR overseen by a committee headed by former senior DURD 
officials165, but it was still based on meeting the ‘expected ultimate capacity of 
Gladesville Bridge [the highest capacity point possible] in peak hours’.166 The 
Department clearly retained considerable power to encourage car use instead of 
restricting it through planned congestion, but it had lost the battle to build its 
outdated radial freeways which would have devastated the urban environment, 
which could not be financed from available funds, and which did not recognise 
the strengths of public transport in servicing the CBD core.167 
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POSTSCRIPT 
The 1977 decisions, which rejected the freeway and the motor car as the 
symbols of the ideal city and as unqualified goods, brought the transport 
planning process back into line with the realities of urban development in Sydney 
and shifted the freeway debate to a more sophisticated level. In particular, the 
much publicised grand plan for inner city radial Ireeways which had generated 
so much opposition was abandoned in favour of more complex approaches. As a 
result of external pressure, generated by new awareness of the problems ol the 
motor car and applied effectively by the state and federal ALPs with the 
assistance of the residents of inner-western Sydney, professional planners and the 
State Government adapted to the expressed dissatisfaction by changing their 
plans where necessary and by assimilating the importance attached to heritage, 
the environment and to public participation. 
Twenty years later, however, not much has changed within the processes 
of the state bureaucracy despite moves to entrench these concerns within the state 
planning ethos through the appointment of more environmentally aware staff 
and devices such as compulsory Environmental Impact Statements (EIS)168 on 
large development projects. The Department of Main Roads (as the Road and 
Traffic Authority (RTA)) remains a creature of roads interests and continues to 
use every possible opportunity to promote the building of more freeways. Aside 
from the M2 in Sydney's north-west and the M5 extensions in Sydney’s inner 
south-west to link Kingsford Smith airport with Badgery's Creek, another very 
recent example of the RTA's aims to ‘piggyback' freeway construction onto 
other developments is the proposal to connect the end of the City-West Link road 
to the end of the Western Freeway at Strathfield in order to link the two 2000 
Olympic venues of Darling Harbour and Homebush Bay. If constructed, this 
proposed road, which will require the demolition of around 200 homes, will be a 
de facto replacement for Western radial freeway rejected in 1977. Similarly, the 
combination of the M2 and the Gore Hill Freeway to Lane Cove will produce a 
de facto North-Western radial freeway, albeit over a different route. 
Although it has recognised the political foolishness of developing and 
publicly promoting rigid grand freeway plans, the RTA has been quite successful 
in pursuing its plans piece by piece with a reduced level of political fall-out. 
Moreover, plans for a number of other freeways also still exist within the 
department, including extension of the Warringah Freeway to the Warringah 
peninsula, construction along a route from Waterfall to Alexandria via Sans 
168 Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) si 11-1 12 
33 
Souci, and several circumferential freeways in Sydney’s western suburbs. 
Whether these and other freeways will eventually be built will depend on funding 
constraints, on the strength of local opposition and on whether the RTA’s hold 
over road transport planning in Sydney can be broken. Another important 
factor will be the relative local and regional merits of public and private 
transport - there is more merit in building the circumferential freeways in 
Sydney’s outer west than there is in paralleling the route of the Illawarra railway 
line in the city’s south. 
Turning to the other factors, the reluctance of governments to finance 
freeway construction can be overcome by contracting with private road builders 
and/or by the imposition of tolls on motorists. The issue of tolls is a contentious 
one, especially in the case of freeways servicing less advantaged areas of a city. 
Tolls impose a significant burden on regular users of a tollway and discourage 
motorists from using the road. They therefore discriminate against people who 
need to use the freeway, a problem which current New South Wales Premier Bob 
Carr recently suggested overcoming by providing exemptions for such users, 
although this may well undermine the funding rationale behind the use of private 
contractors and tolls in the first place. Tollways also mean that the volume of 
traffic on surrounding streets is not as diminished as it would be if the road were 
truly a freeway. 
Another condition favouring freeway construction is community 
ambivalence towards freeways. For example, in the north-western Sydney 
suburb of Epping there are residents’ groups supporting the M2 as well as groups 
opposing it. Those in favour see the tollway as improving residential amenity by 
removing traffic from other arteries such as Epping Road, while those against 
mostly consist of residents whose homes are in the path of or adjacent to the 
freeway corridor and who are worried about noise and air pollution and about 
social dislocation. Whereas suburbs such as Glebe and Annandale had nothing to 
gain and much to lose from the North-Western and Western freeways, with the 
result that resident opposition was almost unanimous, suburbs such as Epping 
will be benefited by the construction of the M2. Consequently, high-profile 
confrontationalist opposition to the M2 has been largely left to students and other 
environmental radicals, associated with Macquarie University, who can much 
more easily be dismissed by planning bureaucrats as an unrespectable minority 
fringe. 
Given the ambiguous states of the other conditions affecting whether 
freeways will be built in Sydney, the politics of the State Government and its 
internal structures assume even greater importance, although due to the public 
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responsiveness of politicians on the issue it is almost inconceivable that some of 
the RTA’s plans, such as the Warringah freeway extension across Middle 
Harbour,169 will ever be implemented. At least up until the last State election, the 
RTA still held almost omnipotent sway over freeway planning in Sydney - it 
remains to be seen whether the newly elected Labor Government's promise to 
establish a central co-ordinative land use planning authority for Sydney will 
come to fruition and prove effective in curtailing the RTA’s planning power. 
Meanwhile, the RTA continues to exist as an independent planning organisation, 
with responsibility for compiling E1S reports on its own projects, and the result 
is a disaster for coherent, co-ordinated urban planning within New South Wales. 
More broadly, Environmental Impact Statements and other such 
investigations have professionalised the treatment of heritage and environmental 
planning issues - they have left final power in the hands of the bureaucratic 
interest groups and therefore arguably merely constitute devices for managing 
the expression of public opinion rather than for making government 
administrators responsive to it. This leaves open the possibility that the gap 
between planning and development may reopen and that militant, largely 
reactive opposition of the kind which arose in the late 1960s and early 1970s may 
arise once more in response to perceived alienation from the planning process. 
The only certainties are that the debate about freeways and other forms of urban 
development will not go away and that residents will not be dictated by 
bureaucracies such as the RTA in ‘the things which affect their lives’.170 
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